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Abstract
We suggest a new micro-foundation of money in which markets are
well-organized but consumers' preferences are stochastic. In this model,
we solve for stationary equilibria and show that there is an optimum quan-
tity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual
behavior in a laboratory experiment. It turns out that the experiment
gives support to our theoretical results.
JEL classication: C91, C92, D 83, E 41, E 51.
Keywords: micro foundations of money, optimal quantity of money.
1 Introduction
Understanding the phenomenon of money is one of the most important chal-
lenges to economics. However, as Hellwig (1993) has argued convincingly, this

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challenge has not yet been mastered satisfactory by economic theory. In macroe-
conomics the relevance of money is not explained but assumed. In the standard
microeconomic model of general equilibrium, money plays no role at all because
markets are assumed to be very well organized and they are assumed to open
once for all times. In sequential market models money is a potential store of
value and can then be made compatible with the general equilibrium model, as
has been demonstrated by Samuelson (1958) in the model of overlapping gen-
erations. However in this model the store of value can better be interpreted as
a social insurance system rather than as money.
To improve upon this unsatisfactory situation, theorists looked deeper into
the role of money by giving it a game theoretic foundation. Starting from the
seminal papers of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993), an impressive liter-
ature developed in which markets are no longer considered to be well organized
but traders meet randomly in pairs, see also Boldrin, Kiyotaki, and Wright
(1993), Trejos and Wright (1995).
This paper suggests a micro-foundation of money that is somewhat orthog-
onal to the standard search model that aroused out of the papers by Kiyotaki
and Wright. On the one hand, we assume that markets are well-organized in
the sense that every potential supplier and every potential demander of a ser-
vice can meet traders of the other side of the market in every period. On the
other hand, we assume that the market participants have stochastic preferences.
Hence some day a trader would prefer to be a supplier of a service and some
other day she prefers to demand the service. The role of money is to allow the
traders to transfer income between supply and demand days.
Our model of money is inspired by trade circles. Trade circles are of increas-
ing importance in modern market economies and they provide good evidence
for clinical studies on the role of money.
1
In a trade circle a set of participants
can receive or deliver services at xed prices. In return the supplier of a service
receives some articial money or coupon, which she can then spend to demand
a service. Prices are xed by some fairness consideration and credit is limited.
The trade circle that is perhaps most well-known to economic theorists is the
Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op. This is because Krugman (1999)
2
illustrated
the relevance of money to the everyday man/woman by means of this instruc-
tive example. In the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op on average 150 couples
tried to share baby-sitting fairly by introducing some coupon system. A coupon
was the entitlement to receive one night of baby-sitting. Initially one coupon
of baby-sitting was issued per couple. Supposing that coupons circulated, over
time every couple would thus receive as many units of baby-sitting as it de-
livered. However, after a short while the system collapsed because there was
insuÆcient demand of baby-sitting. Krugman (1999) attributes this breakdown
to precautionary savings. The Co-op solved this problem simply by issuing more
coupons. And having experienced that every couple was better o due to the
increase in the number of coupons the Co-op issued more and more coupons so
1
See, for example, www.tauschring-archiv.de and http://www.talent.ch.
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See also Sweeney and Sweeney (1977) for a more detailed report on the Great Capitol
Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op.
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that the system broke down again. In the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op at
money has a positive value in exchange for services, it can lead to a Pareto-
improvement over the situation without at money and there is an optimum
quantity of money. That is why we got interested in a model of money that
captures the main features of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op.
In the next section we give a sound theoretical foundation to the anecdote
of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op. We rst model an innite game with
stochastic preferences in which a service can be exchanged using a coupon sys-
tem. Then we suggest a rational solution to the game which is based on in-
dividual optimization against market averages (playing the eld). Markets are
well organized in the sense that in every period in time there is a multilateral
meeting of all suppliers and demanders. Money is essential because it allows to
transfer purchasing power from a period with a low value of time to a period
with a high value of time. Moreover, since credit is limited, in every period,
there is a positive demand for money. We then show that there are always two
types of equilibria. Non-monetary equilibria in which nobody accepts money
and monetary equilibria in which money circulates. The latter Pareto-dominate
the rst. Moreover we show that in our model there is an optimum quantity of
money. The role of money is to coordinate supply and demand. Money has this
coordination role because every rational individual will hold money only up to
some maximum. Hence, by issuing money demand can be stimulated.
Note that our model of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op has many fea-
tures in common with the neo-Keynesian model as it was developed by Clower,
Barro and Grossman, Benassy, Malinvaud and Dreze.
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In both models prices
are xed and demand and supply is coordinated by quantity rationing. Whereas
in the standard neo-Keynesian model money is justied by the notion of a tem-
porary equilibrium the microeconomic foundation of money that our model
provides is based on complete rationality under rational expectations.
Since our model is based on a rigorous idealization|the notion of station-
ary equilibria with rational expectations in a stochastic game|we found it im-
portant to contrast the predictions of our model with actual play of possibly
bounded rational participants in a laboratory experiment. To this end we set
up a market in which six participants per market could repeatedly buy or sell
an abstract commodity. Buying was forbidden if the participant had run out of
articial money, called coupons, and a payo could only be attained if the par-
ticipant was able to buy. In this case the per period payo was the time-value
which was drawn every period randomly and independently across participants.
While the probability distribution of the random process was common knowl-
edge, the time values remained private information to the participants. By and
large the experiment gives evidence that the completely rational solution concept
we have analyzed also has descriptive merits. In all six markets, the behavior of
the participants was exactly as our rational solution concept suggested. Even
though each group forming a market consisted only of six participants, their
behavior was conform with the best response to market averages which is well
3
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in line with our assumption that agents play the eld. Moreover, the median
maximal demand of money was exactly four units as the model predicted for
those parameter values chosen in the experiment. We never observed the non-
monetary equilibrium and money circulated ne in the experiment. It turned
out that there is an optimum quantity of money, which was slightly higher in
a setting with smaller expected time values, in which case there is a higher
potential for a demand shortage.
2 The model
In this section we propose the formalization of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting
Co-op which has been mentioned above. This formal representation will enable
us to derive falsiable conclusions from explicit assumptions on rationality and
characteristics of consumers. The abstraction will also help to set up an exper-
iment in which the implications of the model are tested in a laboratory. Our
formal model of a monetary economy has to embrace three essential properties.
First, the object of trade is of a particular type. There is only one type
of good or service (baby-sitting at night). The good cannot be stored, is not
divisible and can only be supplied in one unit (i.e. one night) which is also the
production time of the good. Each agent (i.e. the parents participating in the
Co-op) can either consume or produce the good but cannot consume the good
he produces. We assume that production of the good incurs no costs.
Second, the decision problem of the agent is subject to particular constraints.
Since each agent can either supply or demand the good at any period in time, he
needs to transfer income across time, if he wants to consume in some period. The
only possibility to transfer income is via the acceptance of money in exchange
for his good, because any form of private credit is ruled out by denition.
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Since
the price of the good is xed to one (by the fairness criterion of the Co-op), trade
takes place as an exchange of one unit of money against one unit of the good.
These considerations highlight that each agent faces an intertemporal decision
problem. In every period in time he needs to decide whether to participate in
the market|which an agent only does if he accepts money|and whether to
supply or demand the good. The actual decision will depend on his preferences
and money holdings as well as on his perception of the value of money. We
assume that preferences are stochastic and the realization which determines the
potential instantaneous utility is observed at the beginning of every period in
time.
Third, we have to formalize the market structure in which all potential
demanders meet all potential suppliers of the good. We assume that there is one
market in every period. At the beginning of the period (i.e. in the morning) all
agents who demand or supply the good at the end of the period announce their
position. Then the market coordinates demand and supply by some non-pricing
mechanism, because the price of the good is xed to one unit of money. Since
4
In a non-monetary barter economy agents would need access to a (complete) market of
contingent commodities because the future states of the individual preferences are unknown.
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the good comes in a non-divisible unit, we model rationing as follows. If both
sides of the market do not match, the longer side is rationed by a mechanism
that randomly selects as many agents from the longer side as there are on the
shorter side. Any agent on the longer side is thus subject to a probability that he
cannot carry out his planned transaction. The non-rationed agents are assigned
randomly and the delivery of the good and the payments are made at the end
of the period (i.e. at night). An agent has to show that he owns at least one
unit of money if he demands the good.
In the following presentation we focus on the main ideas. A rigorous math-
ematical approach can be found in the appendix. Figure 1 shows the optimiza-
tion problem of an agent which is denoted as Game O (the optimization game)
5
.
**Insert Figure 1 here**
Figure 1: The optimization problem of an agent with rationing
The game consists of identical periods t (t = 1; 2; 3; :::). The initial endow-
ment of the agent is M units of money. In every period rst a chance move
determines the time value w: the probability of the high time value h is p
h
and the probability of the low time value l is p
l
= 1   p
h
. Then the agent
selects one of the three alternatives S, B or I. Alternative S corresponds to
\sell baby-sitting," alternative B can be interpreted as \buy baby-sitting" and
alternative I is \stay idle." agents can only select alternative B if they have
money (i.e. if the money holdings m in period t are greater than 0), which is the
\cash in advance constraint." The choice of an agent is executed with success
probability p
S
if she chooses alternative S and with success probability p
B
if
she chooses alternative B. In the market the rationing determines the success
probabilities of which one is always 1, because only one market side might be
rationed. These probabilities depend on the choices of the other agents. For
the rst part of our analysis (theoretical and experimental) we take these prob-
abilities as exogenously given. The quantity of money of the agent and her
utility changes depend on her choice. The changes are given as the vector of the
changes (money, utility) in the gure. Money holdings decrease (increase) if the
agent is successful in buying (selling), and utility increases only if she is able to
buy. In this case it increases by the time-value. At the end of the period the
discounting with rate  takes place. The following restrictions are imposed on
the parameters: 0 < l < h, 0  p
S
 1, 0  p
b
 1, 0 < p
h
< 1, and 0 <  < 1.
A policy  (m;w; t) 2 fB;S; Ig of an agent determines the choice of an agent
given the probabilities p
h
; p
S
; p
B
and the discount rate  depending on her actual
money holdings m, her actual time value w (high h or low l) and the period t.
In the following part we characterize the stationary solution of this optimization
problem. Therefore the policy does not depend on the period. The Bellman
equations can be formulated depending on the state variable money holdings m
5
Although we model the market as a stochastic game we use the term agents instead of
players in this paper
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(see Appendix). V (m) denotes the continuation value of the game if the money
holdings are m, provided agents are risk neutral and all other parameters are
xed. The Bellman equations are:
V (0) =  max
n
p
S
V (1) + (1  p
S
)V (0); V (0)
o
(1)
V (m) = 
X
w=h;l
p
w
max
n
p
B
[w= + V (m  1)] + (1  p
B
)V (m);
p
S
V (m+ 1) + (1  p
S
)V (m); V (m)
o
In every period the optimal stationary policy  
?
of an agent is a solution to
these equations. We do not derive the proofs of existence and uniqueness of the
solution (which can be found in the Appendix), but here it is suÆcient to give
the intuition of the optimal policy  
?
which is:
 Rule 1:  
?
(0; w) = S for w = h; l;
 Rule 2:  
?
(m;h) = B, for all 0 < m and
 Rule 3:  
?
(m; l) = S, for all 0 < m < m; and  
?
(m; l) = B, for all
m  m, for some endogenously chosen m.
Alternative I, staying idle, is never chosen because in the other alternatives
utility or money might be gained. It is weakly dominated.
The intuition for rule 1 is: if an agent has no money it is optimal for her to
choose alternative S (sell baby-sitting) and to try to get some money. Alternative
B (buy baby-sitting) is not possible because of the cash-in-advance constraint.
The best alternative for an agent is to obtain money.
The optimal choice of an agent who has the high time value h (and money)
is alternative B (buy baby-sitting), because the maximal utility she can obtain
for one unit of money is the high time value. Keeping the money will reduce the
utility that she might obtain by at least the discounting rate. This motivates
rule 2.
The third rule states that it is optimal for an agent not to hold more than
m units of money. If she has more money, she chooses alternative B, even if
her time value is low. An intuitive reason for this maximal quantity of money
holdings is the following. If an agent has money holdings of m, the decision
taken in this period is irrelevant for the optimal continuation in the next m
periods. An agent can use the additional unit of money that she might obtain
this period in the (m + 1)th period for the rst time. Rule 3 results from
the observation that an agent should go for the lower time value now if the
discounting of the expected utility in the (m + 1)th period leads to a lower
expected utility than the lower time value l (times the success probability). If
the inequality holds in the other direction an agent should choose the additional
unit of money. That m is not innite can be seen by a very crude boundary
consideration: the maximal utility an agent can get in the (m + 1)th period is
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the high time value h. Discounting h for enough (m) periods will lead to lower
utility than the lower time value l (times the success probability) if m is high
enough. Therefore, the lower time value is preferred to the additional unit of
money. A numerical solution of the Bellman equation gives the result m = 4
for the success probabilities being 1, the chances of a high and a low time value
being equal,p
h
= p
l
= 0:5, and the continuation probability  being 95%.
3 The market equilibrium
We consider a market with a continuum identical agents as described above.
Moreover, we will only investigate symmetric equilibria in which all agents use
the same optimal policy. It is therefore suÆcient to look at the behavior of a
representative agent. Before we dene the market equilibrium we look at the
stationary distribution of money holdings that results from the agents` policies
meeting in a market if the probability of the high time value and the success
probabilities are given. Note that the policy of an agent solving the Bellman
equations denes a Markov chain as shown in Figure 2.
**Insert Figure 2 here**
Figure 2: The Markov chain resulting from the optimal policy.
The state space is N, the endogenous money holdings, of an agent. The prob-
abilities of the time value and the success probabilities determine the transition
probabilities. According to the rule for her optimal policy  
?
the transition
probabilities are zero if m < 0 or m > m. For 0  m  m the probability
for a transition from m to m+ 1 is (1  p
h
)  p
S
and for the transition from m
to m   1 the probability is p
h
 p
B
. With probability 1   p
S
  p
h
 (p
B
  p
S
)
the money holdings stay at m. For m = 0 the probability of the transition to
m = 1 is p
S
and with probability 1   p
S
the money holdings remain at 0. At
m the probability to change to m  1 is p
B
and it is 1  p
B
to stay at m. Since
all probabilities are strictly positive, the Markov chain is irreducible and, thus,
possesses a unique stationary distribution 
?
. A given stationary distribution
 determines the rationing, i.e. the success probabilities p
S
and p
B
by
6
p
S
= min
(
1;
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(B)
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(S)
)
(2)
p
B
= min
(
1;
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(S)
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(B)
)
In this equation the probability that an agent wants to buy baby-sitting
(choose alternative B) is determined and compared with the probability that
6
1
 (m;w)
(S) is the indicator function which gives value 1 if 1
 (m;w)
= S and value zero
otherwise.
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an agent wants to sell baby-sitting (alternative S). The probability of selling
if the money holdings are m is the probability of getting the time value w if
the choice given by the policy depending on m and w,  (m;w), is selling, it is
zero if the choice is buying. The total probability of selling is the sum over all
these probabilities for xed m weighted with the probability of having money
holdings of m given by the stationary distribution. The probability of buying
(alternative B) is determined in the same way. The success probability of the
shorter market side is set to one and the success probability of the longer market
side is the quotient of the probabilities which is smaller one.
To get some intuition on the rationing mechanism rst look at the case
p
h
= p
l
= 0:5. Provided the agents use the optimal policy  
?
the only impor-
tant probabilities are the probabilities at 0 and m, because all other terms are
identical for buying and selling. If the probability at zero is greater than at m
more agents want to sell baby-sitting than agents want to buy it according to
the optimal policy. Thus selling is rationed and vice versa.
One should realize that the success probabilities dened in (2) are equal to
the prescribed ones (p
B
and p
S
). Let us consider the case p
S
= 1 (the case
p
B
= 1 is analogous). By equation (2) given the policy  
?
, we get
p
B
 
m 1
X
m=1
(m) p
l
+ (m)
!
=
m 1
X
m=1
(m) p
h
+ (0)
This equation requires that in each period in time the number of agents whose
money holdings decrease by one (due to actually buying the good) is equal to
the number of agents whose money holdings increase by one (due to actually
selling the good). This condition is satised by stationarity of .
In the market, given a policy  (which is optimal for xed success proba-
bilities p
S
and p
B
) the quantity of money M in that market also inuences the
stationary distribution of the Markov chain and the success probabilities p
S
and
p
B
resulting from the stationary distribution . The intuition of this inuence
is that the higher the quantity of money the higher is the probability of high
money holdings in the stationary distribution of the Markov chain. The higher
the probability of high money holdings the more money agents have on average
and the more agents want to buy baby-sitting compared to selling. The lower
the initial money holdings the less agents want to buy. This eect determines
the rationing. For the special case p
h
= p
l
= 0:5 and the agents using the
optimal policy  
?
the probability to stay at m compared to the probabilities to
stay at zero increases if the quantity of money M increases which determines
the rationing. Technically the \consistency" of the quantity of money and the
success probabilities is implied by the condition that the quantity of money has
to be equal to the average money holdings:
P
m2N
m (m) =M .
All these factors that inuence the market have to be \consistent" in an
equilibrium, i.e. the policies have to result from the optimization of the agents
given the other factors, the success probabilities given by the stationary dis-
tribution have to be the same as the ones taken for the determination of the
policy and the quantity of money has to be equal to average money holdings of
8
an agent. These considerations dene a stationary equilibrium.
A stationary equilibrium is a tuple ( 
?
; 
?
; p
S
?
; p
B
?
;M
?
), consisting of a
stationary policy, a distribution over money holdings, success probabilities, and
a quantity of money, such that
(i) given p
S
?
and p
B
?
,  
?
is an optimal policy for the Bellman equations (1);
(ii) given  
?
, p
S
?
and p
B
?
, 
?
is a stationary probability measure for the
corresponding Markov chain on N (the money holdings);
(iii) given  
?
and 
?
, the probabilities p
S
?
and p
B
?
satisfy the rationing given
by (2);
(iv) the average money holdings are equal to the average money supply, i.e.
P
m2N
m 
?
(m) =M
?
;
for given characteristics of the agent.
3.1 Monetary equilibria and the optimal quantity of money
Given the denition of a stationary equilibrium one can prove the existence
of stationary equilibria. The existence of non monetary equilibria is easy to
understand: For any characteristic of an agent and any amount of money a
non-monetary equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium p
B
?
is zero. In this market
everybody wants to buy baby-sitting and nobody wants to sell. It is also obvious
that no agent improves by selling baby-sitting, because with the additional unit
of money received for selling baby-sitting she never can buy baby-sitting which
is the only way to improve her utility.
It is more diÆcult to understand the existence of monetary equilibria for any
characteristic of an agent and given success probabilities p
B
> 0 and p
S
> 0.
The idea of this existence is analogous to the way we tried to subdivide the
problem in the previous parts of this paper. Given the success probabilities an
optimal policy is determined by solving the Bellman equations. Given this policy
a stationary distribution on the money holdings is given which is "consistent"
with the success probabilities taken for the determination of the optimal policy.
The initial endowment with money is determined such that it is equal to the
average money holdings. For details see the appendix A.
Another interpretation of this result is that agents assume certain success
probabilities (for example: p
S
= p
B
= 1, i.e. no rationing will occur) and deter-
mine their policy by optimization. In a market the quantity of money and the
policy determine a dynamic process which determine the success probabilities in
the market. These success probabilities have to be identical to the ones assumed
for the optimization. The quantity of money is the parameter that allows to
adjust the success probabilities of the process to the success probabilities taken
for the determination of the policy. The quantity of money is chosen such that
the average money holdings under the assumption the policy works are equal to
this quantity of money. This adjusts the success probabilities.
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The general existence result for monetary equilibria when the quantity of
money can be chosen by an institution outside the model of our monetary econ-
omy raises the question on the optimum quantity of money. Obviously, any
non-monetary equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by every monetary equilibrium.
However, this does not provide a satisfactory answer in the case of a benevolent
social planner who maximizes the welfare in the economy. The most simple
measure is that of the number of trades. The number of trades is maximal if
no rationing occurs (p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1). If there is rationing, some agents cannot
trade and thus obtain lower utility than in an equilibrium without rationing.
While this criterion only measures individual but not social welfare it provides
a simple benchmark for the social planner's policy.
We have the following result. There exists some quantity of money M
?
and
a corresponding monetary stationary equilibrium such that no rationing occurs
(p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1). Every quantity of money which is dierent to M
?
leads to a
stationary equilibrium in which the number of trades is strictly less.
The existence of an equilibrium with p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1 has been shown above.
In the equilibrium without rationing and the quantity of money M
?
the num-
ber of trades is maximal, because no rationing occurs. We have to compare
the utility an agent obtains in this equilibrium with the utility she gets in any
other equilibrium with dierent quantity of money M
1
. In the second equilib-
rium rationing has to occur, because if p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1 the policies of the agents
would be the same, leading to the same Markov chain and the same quantity of
money. If rationing occurs in an equilibrium the utility that a player obtains in
this equilibrium is lower than in a non equilibrium policy combination without
rationing in which the same policy is used, but the quantity of money M
2
is
dierent. This non equilibrium policy combination is dominated by the equilib-
rium policy combination with (p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1) and the quantity of money M
?
,
because the equilibrium policy is the solution to the Bellman equations without
rationing. For details see the appendix A.
This shows that it is legitimate to call the quantity of money that is deter-
mined this way the optimum quantity of money.
4 The Experiment
Our goal in the experiment is to test the predictions of the model. Predic-
tions fall within two categories: individual behavior in an articial resp. actual
market and market dynamics. We shortly summarize our hypotheses and the
implementation of the model in an experimental setting before giving a detailed
description of the experimental procedure and experimental results.
The rst prediction is that individual behavior should render the optimal
policy. That is, (1) no money holdings should imply choosing action S (sell);
(2) if money holdings are non-zero observing a high time-value should result in
playing B (buy) and (3) if money holdings are non-zero and below some certain
quantitym, observing a low time-value should imply S; if money holdings exceed
m, alternative B should be chosen. Especially if agents are risk neutral m = 4.
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The second hypothesis concerns our assumption that agents play the eld
and do not engage in strategic reasonings how to inuence market averages.
That is, the individual behavior described in the rst hypothesis should be
observed with or without actual markets. In particular a decrease in the prob-
ability of the high time-value should have a uniform impact regardless of the
initial endowment of money.
The third hypothesis is derived from the result on the optimum quantity
of money. In every market there is some quantity of money for which the
average number of transactions is maximal. The optimal quantity depends on
the fundamentals; in particular the less probable the high time-value, the lower
the maximal money holdings. Especially if agents are risk neutral (m = 4) and
if p
h
= p
l
= 0:5 the optimal quantity of money M
?
= m=2 = 2, because of the
symmetry of the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
The experiments are organized in two stages. First individual behavior is
analyzed in games in which participants play against nature without markets.
Subjects play these games repeatedly on computer terminals|referred to as
the learning phase. After subjects have acquired experience in these games, a
strategy game is carried out. In the strategy game subjects have to determine
their individual strategies for each game. A form was supplied, but subjects
were allowed to use a blank sheet of paper and did not need to ll in this
form. Second we let subjects interact in a common market, facing the decisions
of other human subjects. The procedure is the same as in the case discussed
above. This approach is intended to reveal whether the notion of a stationary
equilibrium in our model|which is based on complete rationality|is a realistic
description of actual behavior in a situation with actual market-interaction.
In order to perform the experimental testing of our hypotheses in a labo-
ratory, we have to operationalize our model. In the experiment the time-value
corresponds to a potential monetary payo. The discounting in the model is
implemented as the break-o probability of the game. While the model postu-
lates an innite number of agents in the market, the number of subjects in the
experiment has to be nite. A detailed description of the games follows.
Individual Behavior Game. Two games have been implemented to an-
alyze the individual behavior in an articial market. Each game consists of a
maximum number of 100 periods. All periods are identical in both games. At the
beginning of each period a random number generator determines the time-value
of the subject. The probability of the two time-values is set to p
h
= p
l
= :5. Af-
ter observing the time-value, agents have to choose one of the three alternatives
S (selling), B (buying), or I (staying idle). Alternative B can only be chosen if
money holdings are not zero. When the agent has made her choice, it is decided
by a random draw whether the intention of the subject is put into execution.
In game N (no rationing), the success-probabilities are p
B
= p
S
= 1, i.e. no
rationing takes place and each choice of agents is actually executed. In game R
(rationing), the success-probabilities are p
B
= p
S
= :8, i.e. rationing takes place
and each choice of the agents is only executed in 80% of all cases.
Depending on the agent's choice and on the outcome of the random draw
determining whether this choice is put into action, the money holdings and the
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accumulated payos of the agent change. If S had been chosen then money
holdings increase by one. If B had been chosen then money holdings decrease
by one and the time-value is added to the payo account. Nothing happens
if choice I had been made. At the end of each period it is determined by a
random draw whether the game ends. If the game ends, money holdings of
agents become worthless and the accumulated payos turn into cash for the
subject.
Market Game. The individual behavior in an actual market has also been
analyzed in two games. Six participants interact in a market. The order of
events is analogous to the game in an articial market except that the rationing
depends on the choices of the participants. In each period the longer side of the
market is rationed according to an i.i.d. random draw such that the number of
selected subjects matches the shorter side. All selected subjects on the longer
side and all subjects on the shorter side actually trade. The time-value of
each subject is also determined by a random draw that is i.i.d. across time and
subjects.
In game M:5 the probability of the high time-value is set to p
h
= :5; and in
game M:2 we set p
h
= :2. Each market was made up of six participants. With
a total of 36 participants who were students at the university of Zurich, we
have six independent observations of the market game. The rational for game
R in which participants are rationed regardless of the side of the market they
choose is founded in this implementation of the market game. Suppose money
holdings do not matter and strategies of all subjects are buy/sell when observing
a high/low time-value. Then for p
h
= :5 the probability of actually making a
trade in the current period from the perspective of a subject (regardless of
the particular action chosen) is 68:75%. That is, due to the fact that a small
number of subjects trade in a common market, the average number of high
(resp. low) time-value actually realized diers from the expected number in
most cases. However, this should not inuence the result, because if the success
probabilities for selling or buying are the same (p
B
= p
S
) the same behavior
should be observed as if both were 1.
Payment of each participant is based on his/her individual performance in
the experiment. The experiments were conducted in the computer laboratory of
the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich.
No communication was allowed between participants and computer terminals
were separated from one another. Total time for the experiment was about
four hours. Each game was played for about one hour with instructions (see
Appendix) given in the rst 15 minutes.
Throughout the experiment we let  = 0:95 (i.e. break{o probability is 5%
in each round), h = 10, and l = 5. Each unit is worth 0:05 SFr. ( $0:03). All
parameter settings are common information. At the beginning of each game all
participants were given an identical initial endowment of m (m = 1; 3; 8) units
of money (i.e. helicopter-money), called coupons. The traded commodity was
not termed. The average payo of participants was about 100 SFr. ( $60).
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4.1 Results
The strategy game is analyzed to compare the experimental results with the
hypotheses we want to verify. We analyze the strategy game, because we are
interested in the behavior of experienced agents who have passed through the
\learning phase" with a repeated play of the respective game.
The main observation in the outcome of the strategy game concerns the
structure of the strategies specied by the participants. The strategies of all
participants consist of three phases: start phase, main phase, end phase. The
start phase seems to be caused by the fact that 20 periods were played for sure.
The end phase might be caused by the nite number (100) of periods. Since
we are interested in the stationary behavior of subjects we analyze the main
phase. All strategies are of the form described in our rst hypothesis. Table 3
in the Appendix gives a full description of the result of the strategy game and
lists the median of m across groups. The result is signicant because 36 out of
36 observations are of this type.
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Summarizing we can conclude that our rst
prediction is conrmed.
Let us next discuss the properties of the maximal number of coupons held
by subjects. Table 3 shows that this quantity exhibits high variation across
subjects within each game. The median m over all subjects is given by m = 4
in the games N, R, and M.5 for all initial endowments m = 1; 3; 8 of coupons,
except for game M.5 with m = 1 in which the median m = 3:5. In game M.2
we nd that m = 2:75 for the initial endowment m = 1, and m = 3 for the
initial endowments m = 3; 8. Under the assumption that success probabilities
are equal to 1, the theoretical model predicts (regardless of the initial money
holdings) m = 4 in games N and M.5, m = 2 in game M.2 and m = 3 in
game R. These values are determined numerically, see Schenk-Hoppe (2001a).
Summarizing we can state that the experimental results on the maximal amount
of money holdings are in good agreement with the theoretical model.
We now turn to a comparison of dierent games to examine our second hy-
pothesis that subjects play the eld and do not engage in strategic reasonings
how to inuence market averages. Table 1 evaluates the six independent ob-
servations (one for each group) on the changes of the median between dierent
games. Except for the clear pattern in the change in the mean from game M.5
to M.2, Table 1 does not provide any strong evidence about the direction of
change of the median between dierent games.
**Insert Table 1 here**
The hypothesis that subjects play the eld can be tested empirically by the
change from game R (or N) to game M.5. Our prediction is that there is no
change in the median of m. It is clear from Table 1 that there is no strong
empirical evidence against our hypothesis. Even on a signicance level of 30%
7
The hypothesis that half of the population from which participants are drawn would
pursue a dierent strategy is rejected in a one-sided binomial test on a signicance level of
0:1%.
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the hypothesis that m is constant is not rejected in a binomial test. However,
the eect of a change in the initial endowment of coupons is not very strong.
For instance in game M.5 the median m increases only slightly in merely 2 out
of 6 groups when the initial endowment increases from m = 1 to m = 8. In
game M.2 this eect is present in 3 groups. If subjects would fully take into
account their own potential to eect market averages, an increase of at least
about 5 coupons in the maximum money holdings should be observed. This is
not the case here, see Table 3. The hypothesis that m increases more than one
coupon is rejected in a one-sided binomial test on a signicance level of 2%.
Let us also compare the eect of a change in the probability p
h
for dierent
initial endowments. Table 1 shows that the direction of change of m from game
M.5 to M.2 is signicant. For each initial endowment m decreases in 6 out of 6
observations.
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Thus changes in the fundamentals have the predicted eect and
give a hint that subjects actually play the eld.
Summarizing we may conclude that our second hypothesis is supported by
the data.
We nally address the third hypothesis on the optimum quantity of money.
We employ the strategies that subjects supplied in the strategy game in a numer-
ical simulation of the markets M.5 and M.2. The simulations are implemented
as MATLAB scripts and are available on the web (Schenk-Hoppe 2001a). It is
worth to point out that maximal money holdings vary with the initial endow-
ment in 17 (resp. 15) out of 36 case in game M.5 (resp. M.2). Thus one cannot
expect to obtain a clear-cut result.
The strategy of every subject within a group are taken from Table 3. In order
to obtain a most complete specication of the eect of dierent quantities of
money, we linearly interpolate the maximalm of each subject over non-retrieved
initial money holdings by using the available data for m = 1; 3; 8. For simplicity
the results are rounded to integers.
Starting from a uniform initial distribution of money holdings m over sub-
jects (thus m is the quantity of money), we simulate the market interaction
for 10; 000 iterations (ignoring the break-o probability). From these data we
calculate the average number of trades in a single period and the average time-
values realized by the subjects in (Schenk-Hoppe 2001a). Table 2 details the
numerical results.
**Insert Table 2 here**
One further nds that trade breaks down in game M.5 (game M.2) for all
groups if the quantity of money M  8 (M  5).
For all groups and market games we observe an increase of transactions
from an initial endowment of 1 to an optimal endowment m
O
(1 < m
O
< 8)
and a decrease for higher endowments. The hypothesis that the number of
transactions does not depend on the initial endowment is rejected on a 2%
8
The hypothesis that half of the population would hold more money in game M.2 than in
game M.5 is rejected in a one-sided binomial-test on a signicance level of 2%.
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signicance level for all markets. This strongly supports our third hypothesis.
For a further test of our predictions we compare the optimal initial endowments
m
O
with the predicted optimal quantities.
The benchmarks for the average number of trades and realized time-values
are as follows. The maximum number of trades in any one period is 3, i.e. both
sides of the market are of the same length for all periods in time. The expected
time-value of each subject is 7.5 in game M.5 resp. 6 in game M.2. Assuming
that buyers have an expected time-value that matches the overall expected time-
value, a proxy for the average time-value is 3.75 in game M.5 resp. 3 in game
M.2.
Given these benchmarks we can state that the monetary economy deter-
mined by the strategy game works surprisingly well. The average number of
trades reaches 2.15 in game M.5 and 2.26 in game M.2; and the average realized
time-value tops at 3.37 in game M.5 and 2.66 in game M.2. The median of
the quantities of money for which trades resp. payos are maximal is M = 2 in
game M.5 whereas in game M.2 the median is 3 for trades and 2.5 for payos. In
game M.5, 4 out of 6 observations are conform with M = 2 being the optimum
quantity of money. The hypothesis that the optimum quantity of money is not
in the interval [2; 3] is rejected on a signicance level of 5%. In group 1 the
behavior of subject 3 stands out, because it has a very high m. This behavior
stimulates trade within the respective group even for high quantities of money.
Beside the fact m exceeds the total amount of money in games M.5 and M.2
with m = 1, a reason for not being reluctant to hold so many coupons may be
a dissenting individual perception of the break-o probability.
For the sake of comparison we simulate an articial model in which m = 4
(resp. m = 3) for all agents in game M.5 (resp. game M.2). It turns out that
average trades and payos are maximal for M = 2 in game M.5. The average
number of trades is 2.13 and the average payo is 3.35. In game M.2, the
quantity of moneyM = 2 is also optimal. The average number of trades is 2.08
and the average payo is 2.57.
We can state that performance of subjects|which exhibit a high degree of
heterogeneity|is very good compared to this articial market in which agents
are homogenous.
Summarizing the experimental results we can conclude that there is experi-
mental evidence for the correctness of our theoretical model which is based on
complete rationality of agents. In the median the behavior of the participants in
the experiment coincided with the optimal behavior of the representative agent
as predicted by the model. The concept of a stationary (monetary) market
equilibrium which assumes that agents \play the eld" was also conrmed by
the experiments. Even though each market consisted only of six participants,
the median of their behavior was conform with the best response to market
averages. We observed that money circulated ne in the dierent markets and
the average number of trades and realized time-values were surprisingly high.
In each market game an optimum quantity of money could be determined.
**Insert Table 3 here**
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5 Tables and Figures
N to R N to M.5 R to M.5 M.5 to M.2
(initial m) (initial m) (initial m) (initial m)
Direction of change 1 3 8 1 3 8 1 3 8 1 3 8
increased 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0
unchanged 3 5 4 2 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 0
decreased 1 0 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6
Table 1: Evaluation of the strategy game: Number of groups in which the
median of m increases/remains constant/decreases between dierent games.
Game M.5 Game M.2
quantity of money quantity of money
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4
Trans. 1.85 2.05 2.09 2.08 1.81 0.50 0.85 1.19 1.37 2.25
1
Value 3.03 3.31 3.29 3.18 2.58 0.62 1.30 1.74 1.93 2.64
Trans. 1.97 2.15 1.96 1.25 0.0 0.0 1.74 2.26 1.55 0.0
2
Value 3.09 3.32 2.89 1.66 0.0 0.0 2.09 2.66 1.59 0.0
Trans. 1.89 2.14 1.99 0.91 0.0 0.0 1.13 1.77 2.22 0.0
3
Value 3.09 3.35 2.94 1.16 0.0 0.0 1.57 2.27 2.34 0.0
Trans. 1.85 2.14 1.83 0.50 0.0 0.0 0.94 1.83 0.80 0.0
4
Value 3.04 3.37 2.61 0.62 0.0 0.0 1.44 2.36 0.80 0.0
Trans. 2.10 2.14 1.97 0.93 0.0 0.0 1.02 1.16 1.99 0.80
5
Value 3.20 3.25 2.87 1.20 0.0 0.0 1.51 1.68 2.46 0.81
Trans. 1.92 2.06 2.08 2.07 2.07 1.95 0.90 1.25 1.75 1.74
6
Value 2.99 3.23 3.27 3.23 3.18 2.85 1.26 1.67 2.06 1.76
Table 2: Average number of transactions (Trans.) and average realized time-
values (Value) per period in both market games for dierent quantities of money.
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Game N Game R Game M.5 Game M.2
(initial m) (initial m) (initial m) (initial m)
Grp. Part. 1 3 8 1 3 8 1 3 8 1 3 8
1 6 4 4 6 4 4 6 4 6 5 3 5
2 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 6 6 6
3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
1
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 5
5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
6 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 2
median 5.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 3.5 3.5 5
7 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 1 4 1
8 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 3 9 1 3 9
9 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 2 4 4
2
10 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3
11 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3
12 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 6 6 2 3 3
median 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 4 4 4 4.5 2 3 3
13 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 6 3 3 7 5
14 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2
15 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 2 2 2
3
16 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5
17 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
18 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 1 2 2
median 5 5 5.5 6 6.5 5 3 3.5 3 2.5 2.5 2.5
19 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 2 2 2
20 6 8 10 9 6 10 5 4 8 3 3 4
21 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4
22 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
23 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 6.5
24 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
median 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4 4 4 3 3 3.5
25 5 7 12 5 7 12 3 6 10 2 4 9
26 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 3 3 3
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 2
5
28 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 2
29 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
30 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 11 11 11
median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5
31 15 15 15 15 15 15 6 11 14 6 9 13
32 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 1 1 1
33 4 4 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 1
6
34 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
35 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 7 7 7
36 5 6 8 4 6 8 5 4 6 5 5 8
median 5 5.5 6.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 4 3.5 4.5 3.5 3 4
Table 3: Evaluation of the strategy game: Maximal number of coupons m
that subjects wanted to hold detailed for all games and initial endowments of
money.
(Subject 23 is indierent between 2 and 3 as maximal money holdings and randomizes with
probability one half.)
18
19
20
A Appendix: The formal approach
Let us describe the formal model. We assume that there is a continuum of innitely-lived
identical agents, denoted by the interval [0; 1]. We can thus speak of the representative agent,
or simply \the agent." The assumption on the number of agents rules out any impact of
strategic behavior of single individuals, i.e. each agent \plays the eld." Time is discrete and
divided into periods in which each agent can produce one unit of the good. Production incurs
no cost for the agent. We assume that agents only derive utility from consumption of the
good.
There is a xed quantity of a tangible non-consumable good, called money. The amount
of money is exogenously given. The price of the consumption good is xed to one unit of
money. We assume that agents have unknown histories. Thus private credit is ruled out and
money is essential.
In each period in time, each agent has the following decision possibilities. He can oer to
supply one unit of the good (S = sell), to demand a unit of the good (B = buy), or to stay idle
(I). Each agent faces a cash-in-advance constraint; he cannot demand the good (buy) if his
money holdings are zero. Whether a transaction actually takes place or not is depending on
the ratio of buyers to sellers. As explained above, each agent on the shorter side is assigned
a trading partner on the longer side by some random draw which is i.i.d. (independent and
identically distributed) across time and agents. In the following, we call the probabilities to
actually realize the sell/buy plan the success probabilities.
We assume that each agent has stochastic preferences that vary across time. The most
simple approach is to postulate that each agent's preferences in each period are described
by the realization of a two-valued i.i.d. random variable. Every agent privately observes the
realization of the random draw before making a decision. The revealed value is the maximum
(instantaneous) utility an agent can achieve in the respective period. The interpretation is
straightforward. Two types of events can happen, say hardrock or classic concert; both of
which the agent can only attend when he buys the good in the corresponding period. The two
values of the random draw are associated to these events in the sense that they describe the
personal ranking of the possible events expressed in terms of the derived utility from attending
the event. While the individual realization dier in each period, the statistical properties of
the realization are identical for all agents across time. Moreover, there will be a constant
amount of agents with the high resp. low value in all periods. With this model of preferences
we cannot expect to capture the phenomenon of precautionary savings, but we provide a
very simple mechanism that stimulates trade which can only occur if some heterogeneity of
agents prevails. The two values will represent potential pecuniary rewards in each round in
the experiment.
The agent's objective is supposed to be the persuasion of a feasible plan that maximizes
the expected present value of the total utility. For the sake of analytical tractability, we
assume that agents are risk-neutral. One can interpret the discounting rate as the one-period
survival probability of an agent who maximizes the no-discounting present value. A blend of
both factors is also captured in this framework. Agents with nite lifetime of certain length
would not accept money if they are rational.
We next derive the agent's optimization problem. Let us rst dene the exogenous vari-
ables. Let the time-value w
t
, t  0, be an independent and identically distributed process on
the measurable space (W;P(W )) withW = fl; hg, h  l  0, where P() denotes the power set.
The probability distribution of w
t
is denoted by P
w
= (p
l
; p
h
), where p
w
= Probfw
t
= wg,
w = l; h. Further, to formalize the success probabilities, let z
t
, t  0, be a process on the
measurable space (Z;P(Z)) with Z = f0; 1g
2
such that z
s
(i) and z
t
(j) are independent for
all s; t 2 N, s 6= t, and all i; j = 1; 2. Let the probability distribution of the rst resp. second
component of z
t
be given by (1   p
B
; p
B
) resp. (1   p
S
; p
S
), where p
B
= Probfz
t
(1) = 1g
and p
S
= Probfz
t
(2) = 1g. p
S
is the probability that an agent can actually sell if she decides
to oer her good and, respectively, p
B
is the probability that her demand will be satised.;
afterwards called success probabilities. Accordingly, let (W
t
;W
t
) and (Z
t
;Z
t
) denote the
measurable spaces associated to sequences of length t.
The state variable is a pair of money holdings m and time-value w. Money holdings
is an endogenous variable. The state space of the system is therefore given by (S;S) :=
(N  W;P(N) 
 P(W )). The feasible actions can be formalized by a correspondence   :
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S ! A, A = fB; S; Ig. We have that  (m;w)  A for all m  1, and { due to the cash-
in-advance constraint {  (0; w)  fS; Ig. The graph of   is given by the measurable set
D = f(m;w;a) j a 2  (m;w)g  N  W  A. Note that the set of feasible actions is
independent of the time-value.
Money holdings, F : D  Z ! N, is a ow variable whose evolution depends on the
position an agent takes as well as on the outcome of the rationing procedure. We dene it
together with the return function U : D  Z ! fl; hg as follows,
F (m;w;B; z) = m  1; and U(m;w;B; z) = w; if z(1) = 1;
F (m;w;S; z) = m+ 1; and U(m;w;S; z) = 0; if z(2) = 1;
F (m;w; a; z) = m; and U(m;w; a; z) = 0; otherwise.
Hence, money holdings decrease (increase) if the agent is successful in buying (selling),
and utility increases only if she is able to buy. In this case it increases by the time-value. A
plan is a sequence of functions  = f
t
g
1
0
, where 
t
:W
t
 Z
t
! A is W
t

 Z
t
-measurable
for all t  0. Hence the action that is taken at t, a
t
2  (m
t
; w
t
), depends on the history of
the time-values, money holdings, and success probabilities.
A plan  is feasible from an initial state s
0
= (m
0
; w
0
) if in addition it satises
 
0
2  (s
0
)
 
t
(w
t
; z
t
) 2  (m

t
(w
t 1
; z
t
); w
t
), for all (w
t
; z
t
) 2W
t
 Z
t
, t  1.
where the functions m

t
:W
t 1
 Z
t
! N are dened recursively by
 m

1
(w
0
; z
1
) = F (m
0
; w
0
; 
0
; z
1
), for all z
1
2 Z
 m

t+1
(w
t
; z
t+1
) = F (m

t
(w
t 1
; z
t
); w
t
; 
t
(w
t
; z
t
); z
t+1
), for all (w
t
; z
t+1
) 2W
t
Z
t+1
,
t  1.
The money holdings of the agent at the beginning of period t, denoted by m

t
, are the key
determinants of the feasibility of a plan .
For each s
0
2 S, let (s
0
) be the set of feasible plans from s
0
. For each  2 (s
0
), dene
m

= fm

t
g
1
t=1
as above. Further, let m

0
= m
0
.
We can now state the optimization problem of an representative agent with discount rate
 2 (0; 1). For any initial state s
0
, the agent determines a plan that takes the supremum
v
?
(s
0
) := sup
2(s
0
)
E

1
X
t=0

t
U(x

t
; w
t
; 
t
; z
t+1
)

(3)
for any given initial state s
0
.
The expected value of the supremum over the realization of w
0
is given by
V
?
(m) = p
h
v
?
(m;h) + p
l
v
?
(m; l) (4)
because agents are risk{neutral by assumption. V
?
: N ! R is a solution to the Bellman
equation,
V (0) =  max
n
p
S
V (1) + (1   p
S
) V (0); V (0)
o
(5)
V (m) = 
X
w=h;l
p
w
max
n
p
B
[w= + V (m  1)] + (1   p
B
) V (m);
p
S
V (m + 1) + (1   p
S
)V (m); V (m)
o
where the decision in the maximization operator is contingent on the realization of the stochas-
tic preferences. This decision characterizes the optimal stationary policy  
?
: N  W !
fB; S; Ig. Since the absolute value of the return function is bounded, the transversality con-
dition holds and, thus, assuming stationarity of z
t
, the sequence problem and the Bellman
equation are equivalent. We have completely described the individual behavior of agents,
given the data p
h
, p
l
, l, h, p
S
, and p
B
.
The individual decisions meet on the market. The market coordinates demand and supply
by the rationing mechanism described above. Denote by  a distribution of money, where (m)
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is the Lebesgue-measure of agents with m units of money. Suppose all agents follow the same
stationary policy  . Then, for given , the success probabilities p
S
and p
B
are given by
p
S
= min
(
1;
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(B)
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(S)
)
(6)
p
B
= min
(
1;
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(S)
P
m2N
(m)
P
w=h;l
p
w
1
 (m;w)
(B)
)
If both numerator and denominator are zero, then both probabilities are set to zero. Hence,
the success probabilities are proportional to the ratio of demand and supply.
For any xed stationary policy  , and xed success probabilities p
S
and p
B
, the trade on
the market implies a dynamics on the set of money holdings over time. That is, each agent's
money holdings evolves according to her policy and the rationing mechanism in each period
in time. Assigning each agent to the state of her money holdings, we have dened a discrete
Markov chain on N, the set of money holdings.
Summarizing, a stationary equilibrium is a stationary policy  , a pair of stationary success
probabilities p
S
; p
B
, and a stationary distribution of money  such that: (i) the policy is
optimal given the success probabilities, (ii) the distribution of money holdings  is the limit
distribution of the Markov chain given by the policy  and by the success probabilities p
S
; p
B
,
(iii) the success probabilities are consistent with the ratios of demand and supply given  and
 and (iv) average money holdings are equal to average money supply.
We are interested in the existence of stationary equilibria and in the comparative statics
of these equilibria with respect to the money supply. In the next section we rst analyze the
individual behavior, thereafter we give a formal denition of stationary equilibria that allows
us to analyze their properties.
B Analysis of the individual behavior
In this section we analyze the optimal individual decisions of agents which are described by the
Bellman equation (5). Here we lay the foundation for the subsequent study of the equilibria of
the monetary economy in Section C. The main result in this section is an explicit description
of the agent's optimal policy. It turns out that an agent buys if he observes the high value
and he is not cash constraint. This is because the high time-value is the best the agent can
hope for. Hence immediately increasing the return function by this value is always better
than acquiring one more unit of money or staying idle. The interpretation is straightforward.
Moreover, agents only accumulate money up to a certain positive amount. For this amount
of money, the opportunity costs of supplying the good are higher than the utility derived
from consumption even at the low value. Hence, above this level of money holdings the agent
always buys and below this level the agent sells if she has the low time-value. The results are
achieved by a study of the properties of the value function (5).
Throughout the following we impose a restriction of the parameters by making the
Assumption B.1 h > l > 0, p
h
> 0, p
l
> 0, p
B
> 0, and p
S
> 0.
This assumption is imposed in all further results, unless otherwise noted.
Before deriving the qualitative properties of the value function, we show existence and
uniqueness of the solution to the Bellman equation (5) together with some elementary prop-
erties.
Lemma B.1 There exists a unique solution V
?
to the Bellman equation (5). V
?
is positive,
increasing and bounded by h=(1  ).
Proof. Denote by X the set of bounded functions V : N ! R. Dene the (non-empty) subset
of X
Y = fV : N ! R j 0  V (m)  h=(1  ) for all m 2 Ng
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Y is complete with respect to the sup norm. Next, dene an operator T : X ! X via the
Bellman equation (5) as follows. For each function V 2 X, dene the image TV by,
TV (0) :=  max
n
p
S
V (1) + (1   p
S
)V (0); V (0)
o
TV (m) := 
X
w=h;l
p
w
max
n
p
B
[w= + V (m   1)] + (1  p
B
)V (m);
p
S
V (m+ 1) + (1  p
S
)V (m); V (m)
o
Obviously, the solution to the Bellman equation is a xed point of T .
We show that (i) T is a contraction on X; and (ii) T maps Y into itself. This implies that
there exists a xed point of T in Y which is unique in X. Any xed point of T is obviously a
solution to (5) and vice versa.
Let us prove property (i). We employ Blackwell's suÆcient conditions for a contraction,
see e.g. Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, Theorem 3.3), which states: Suppose the operator
T is (1) monotone, i.e. if V;W 2 X with V (n) W (n) for all n 2 N then TV (n)  TW (n) for
all n 2 N, and (2) discounting, i.e. there exists some constant  2 (0; 1) such that T (V +c)(n) 
TV (n) +  c for all V 2 X and c  0 (where the sum of V 2 X and a constant function is
dened by (V + c)(n) := V (n) + c). Then T is a contraction on X. It is straightforward to
check both conditions for the operator T dened above.
We check property (ii) next. First note that V (m) 
P
1
t=0

t
h = h=(1 ) for any policy.
Since T is monotone and maps the set of positive functions into itself (because l  0), it suÆces
to show that the image of the constant functionW (n)  h=(1 ) satises TW (n)  h=(1 )
for all n  0. The denition of T yields that TW (n)  p
B
h+ h=(1  )  h=(1  ), for all
n  0. This yields property (ii).
Finally, note that the set of feasible plans is increasing in the initial endowment of money
m
0
and, therefore, V
?
(m+ 1)  V
?
(m) for all m  0. This nishes the proof. 
Remark B.1 Lemma B.1 implies that playing I (staying idle) is always weakly dominated
by S. We can thus exclude this choice in all further considerations.
A rst result on the optimal policy can be derived by studying the objective function of
the agent. We show that it is optimal to choose action B, whenever m  1 and the realization
of the preferences is w = h.
Lemma B.2 For all m  1,  
?
(m; h) = B.
Proof. First note that h is the maximal value the return function U can take in the agent's
objective function (3). Since the success-probabilities p
B
and p
S
are independent of time, any
action that postpones the action B when m  1 and w = h, decreases total utility by at least
the amount p
B
(1  )h. Therefore a necessary condition for any optimal policy is playing B
when m  1 and w = h. 
This result has the straightforward interpretation already mentioned above. Since utility
is derived only from consumption and e.g. not from the possession of money, the highest
possible value of the stochastic preferences has to \cashed." Lemma B.2 further enables us
to gather more information on the properties of the value function. The main auxiliary result
follows.
Lemma B.3 V
?
is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Proof. Let V
?
be the unique solution to (5) which exists and is unique by Lemma B.1.
We rst show that V
?
is strictly positive. For any m  1, V
?
(m)  p
B
Ew+V
?
(m 1) 
p
B
Ew > 0. In particular this implies V
?
(1) > 0, which yields V
?
(0)  p
S
V
?
(1) > 0.
Therefore, V
?
is strictly positive.
Let us next show that V
?
is strictly increasing. The set of feasible plans is increasing in the
initial endowment of money m
0
and, therefore, V
?
(m+1)  V
?
(m) for all m  0. Moreover,
the actual payo for any elementary event, i.e. along any sample path of the exogenous
stochastic processes, is increasing in the initial endowment of money, because the sequence of
decisions made by an agent with endowment m can also be carried out if the endowment is
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m + 1. To prove the assertion of the Lemma, it therefore suÆces to show that for an event
with strictly positive probability the total utility is strictly increasing in the initial endowment
of money.
Suppose a run of m-times h occurs (an event that has strictly positive probability for each
xed m  1). According to Lemma B.2 an agent with initial endowment m + 1 holds 1 unit
of money, whereas an agent with endowment m is left with no money. The advantage of the
agent with higher initial endowment is V
?
(1)  V
?
(0) at the end of the run. As noted above,
V
?
(0) > 0. This implies V
?
(1)   V
?
(0) =
1 
1 +p
S
V
?
(0) > 0.
Finally, we show that V
?
is strictly concave. Denote by  
?
the corresponding optimal
policy. Suppose V
?
is not strictly concave, i.e. there exists an ~m > 0 such that V
?
( ~m + 1)  
V
?
( ~m)  V
?
( ~m)  V
?
( ~m   1).
Lemma B.2 ensures  
?
( ~m+ 1; h) = B and therefore, by the Bellman equation (5),
V
?
( ~m+ 1) =

1  

p
h
p
B

h

+ V
?
( ~m)  V
?
( ~m+ 1)

+ :::

where the term on the far right of this equation is given by p
l
p
B
(l= +V
?
( ~m)  V
?
( ~m+1)),
if  
?
( ~m+ 1; l) = B, and by p
l
p
S
(V
?
( ~m+ 2)  V
?
( ~m + 1)), if  
?
( ~m + 1; l) = S.
By our assumption that V
?
is not concave at ~m, V
?
( ~m) V
?
( ~m+1)  V
?
( ~m 1) V
?
( ~m).
If w = h is revealed and the agent would pursue from thereon the optimal policy corresponding
to one unit of money less than she actually possesses, she would not be worse o because
V
?
( ~m+ 1) is not decreased. In other words, the agent would not be worse o if she mentally
disposes one unit of money in that case. However, this contradicts optimality of the policy,
because disposing one unit of money leads to a strictly lower total utility because V
?
is strictly
increasing in the money holdings as has been proved above. 
The qualitative properties of the value function listed in Lemma B.3 enables us to give a
complete description of the optimal policy. In particular, since the marginal utility derived
from possessing one additional unit is diminishing and vanishes in the limit (because the value
function is bounded), there is an endogenously determined upper bound of money that an
agent is willing to hold, i.e. for all large enough money holdings m, the optimal policy is
 
?
(m;w) = B for w = h; l. This upper bound is at least one because if the agent does not
accumulate any money, his total expected utility is zero when starting with no endowment of
money. This, however, contradicts Lemma B.3 which ensures V
?
(0) > 0.
Theorem B.1 There exists a maximal amount of money, m, an agent wants to accumulate.
It is given by
m := min

m  1 j
p
B
l

> p
S
[V
?
(m+1)   V
?
(m)] + p
B
[V
?
(m)   V
?
(m 1)]

Further, the optimal policy is given by
  
?
(0; w) = S for w = h; l;
  
?
(m; l) = S, and  
?
(m; h) = B, for all 0 < m < m; and
  
?
(m;w) = B, for w = h; l and all m  m.
Proof. By Lemma B.2 we only have to show that  
?
(m; l) = S for all 0 < m < m and
 
?
(m; l) = B for all m. According to the Bellman equation (5), these properties hold if and
only if p
B
(l=+V
?
(m 1))+(1 p
B
)V
?
(m)  p
S
V
?
(m+1)+(1 p
S
)V
?
(m) for all 0 < m <
m, and p
B
(l=+V
?
(m 1))+(1 p
B
)V
?
(m) > p
S
V
?
(m+1)+(1 p
S
)V
?
(m) for allm. The
conditions are equivalent to p
B
l=  resp.> p
B
(V
?
(m) V
?
(m 1))+p
S
(V
?
(m+1) V
?
(m)).
V
?
(m) is increasing and bounded from above uniformly in m by Lemma B.1. Therefore,
V := lim
m!1
V
?
(m) exists and is bounded by h=(1  ). This implies that m exists and is
nite (p
B
l= > 0).
Since V
?
is concave, see Lemma B.3, V
?
(m)   V
?
(m   1) is decreasing in m. Therefore,
the result is immediate from the denition of m. 
Remark B.2 If the condition in the dening equation of m holds with equality for m = m 1,
the agent is indierent between selling and buying at m  1. In this case it is also optimal to
hold up to m   1 units of money, or to randomize between S and B when possessing m   1
units.
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Theorem B.1 completely characterizes the optimal policy of all agents. We have achieved
this goal by proving certain properties of the value function, and thus did not need to solve
the Bellman equation. However, the maximum money holdings m is not known explicitly
but can be determined numerically for given parameter values. We will need this quantity
when comparing the predictions of the theory with the experimental results. The numerical
procedure employs the convergence procedure applied in the proof of Lemma B.1 (which is
based on Blackwell's suÆcient conditions). To make this approach tractable, we need an
upper bound on m; this allows to apply the procedure of Lemma B.1 on a nite set of money
holdings. We proof the following auxiliary result.
Lemma B.4 Suppose p
S
> 0 and l  0. Then, for all m  0,
V
?
(m+ 1)  V
?
(m)  
m
h
1   + p
S
Proof. Since each optimal policy for the problem with initial endowment of m + 1 units
of money can be pursued at least over a time-horizon of length m with a initial endowment
of m units of money, one has that V
?
(m + 1)   V
?
(m)  
m
(V
?
(1)   V
?
(0)). Using that
V
?
(1) V (0)
?
=
1 
1 + p
S
V (0)
?
(see proof of Lemma B.3) and V (0)
?
 h=(1 ), we obtain
the assertion of the Lemma. 
Using that V
?
is strictly concave (Lemma B.3), the estimate in Lemma B.4 yields an
upper bound on m by inserting this estimate in the right-hand side of the dening equation
of m (Theorem B.1). One nds that m is bounded by the smallest m 2 N such that p
B
l 

m
(p
S
 + p
B
)h=(1   (1   p
S
)).
C Analysis of stationary equilibria
The optimal individual decision of each agent|studied in the previous section|is based on
perceived market conditions such as the probability of actually trading with a seller when
being a buyer. The policy of every agent is confronted with the actual market conditions
when all agents' buying and selling positions meet in the market in a period in time. The
policies might turn out not to be compatible. We therefore introduce the notion of a stationary
equilibrium of our monetary economy. In this equilibrium the perceived and the actual market
conditions coincide, the quantity of money is constant, and the distribution of money holdings
is stationary.
We consider an economy in which the individual behavior be the one dened in Theo-
rem B.1. The individual decisions give rise { via the market { to a dynamics on the set of
money holdings. This dynamics is appropriately described by a Markov chain on the space of
money holdings N. Note that the subset f0; :::;mg is invariant under the Markov chain. If the
perceived success probabilities p
B
and p
S
are strictly positive, the induced Markov chain on
f0; :::;mg is irreducible. This implies the existence of a unique stationary probability measure,
say . The behavior of agents and the measure  implies actual success probabilities, which
may dier from the perceived ones. In particular, the quantity of money, which is dened by
M :=
P
m2N
m (m) (viz. the average-per-capita amount of money), may not be compatible
with the perceived success probabilities in the sense. We next give a denition of an equilib-
rium in which the actual and the perceived probabilities coincide, and in which the quantity
of money is stationary over time. On calling a tupel (; l; h; p
l
; p
h
) the characteristics of the
agent we summarize the description of the model by the denition of a stationary equilibrium.
Denition C.1 A stationary equilibrium is a tuple ( 
?
; 
?
; p
S
?
; p
B
?
;M
?
), consisting of a
stationary policy, a distribution over money holdings, success probabilities, and a quantity of
money, such that
(i) given p
S
?
and p
B
?
,  
?
is an optimal policy for (5);
(ii) given  
?
, p
S
?
and p
B
?
, 
?
is a stationary probability measure for the corresponding
Markov chain on N;
(iii) given  
?
and 
?
, the probabilities p
S
?
and p
B
?
satisfy (6);
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(iv) the average money holdings are equal to the average money supply, i.e.
P
m2N
m 
?
(m) =
M
?
;
for given characteristics of the representative agent.
A stationary equilibrium is called monetary, if the value function solving (5) is strictly
positive on N.
We do not attempt here to discuss how such an equilibrium is achieved by the agents if
the economy starts with a distribution of money that does not coincide with the stationary
distribution but which induces the equilibrium quantity of money. This is possible (though
analytical tractability is certainly challenging) in the framework of random dynamical systems,
see e.g. Schenk-Hoppe (2001b). In a stationary equilibrium no agent has an incentive to follow
a policy that is dierent to the one stated in Theorem B.1.
We rst show that stationary equilibria exist.
Lemma C.1 There exists a non-monetary stationary equilibrium for any characteristics of
the representative agent and any amount of money; in this equilibrium p
?
B
= 0.
Proof. Let p
B
= 0 and p
S
= 1. Then it is optimal to play buy if m  1 and to stay idle
if m = 0 for each realization of the preferences. If everyone wants to buy, then an agent is
not better o when he sells, because he cannot buy afterwards. He is thus indierent between
selling, buying, or staying idle. The value function is identically zero. 
It is straightforward to see that non-monetary stationary equilibria are not unique in
general. Let m be such that no agent wants to accumulate money up to m   1. Then
 
?
(i; w)  B, for i = m  1;m;m + 1, p
S
?
= 1, and p
B
?
= 0 is a (non-monetary) stationary
equilibrium for 
?
(m) = 1 as well as for 
?
(m  1) = 
?
(m+ 1) = 1=2. Due to the existence
of a non-monetary stationary equilibrium and the dependence of the agent's maximal money
holdings on the success probabilities, one cannot expect that monetary stationary equilibria
always exist. Suppose agents are very impatient (i.e.  close to zero) then there cannot exist
a monetary equilibrium with a quantity of money larger than one. An appropriate choice
of the quantity of money is therefore indispensable. However, Lemma B.3 ensures that any
stationary equilibrium which satises Assumption B.1 is monetary. We have the following
result on the existence of monetary stationary equilibria.
Theorem C.1 For any characteristics of the representative agent and any prescribed success
probabilities p
B
> 0 and p
S
> 0 (such that one of them is equal to one), there exists some
quantity of money and a corresponding monetary stationary equilibrium such that p
?
B
= p
B
,
p
?
S
= p
S
, and in which the optimal policy  
?
is given by Theorem B.1.
Proof. Denote by V
?
the solution to the Bellman equation for the given characteristics of
the representative agent and for the given success probabilities p
B
> 0 and p
S
> 0. Dene
the maximal amount of money holdings m according to Theorem B.1.
The policy  
?
, according to Theorem B.1, together with the probabilities p
h
, p
l
, p
B
, and
p
S
denes a Markov chain on the set of money holdings H := f0; :::;mg. Since all probabilities
are strictly positive, the Markov chain is irreducible and, thus, possesses a unique stationary
probability measure  on H. In particular, the support of  is H. Dene the corresponding
quantity of money M
?
:=
P
m
m=0
m (m).
It remains to check that ( 
?
; ; p
B
; p
S
;M
?
) is a stationary equilibrium. First, according to
Theorem B.1, the policy  
?
is optimal, because both success probabilities are strictly positive.
Second,  is a stationary measure by construction, and condition (iv) of Denition C.1 is
satised by the denition of M
?
.
Finally, we need to show that the success probabilities dened in (6) are equal to the
prescribed ones p
B
and p
S
. Let us consider the case p
S
= 1 (the case p
B
= 1 is analogous).
By equation (6), p
B
= p
?
B
for the policy  
?
, if and only if
p
B
 
m 1
X
m=1
(m) p
l
+ (m)
!
=
m 1
X
m=1
(m) p
h
+ (0)
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This equation requires that in each period in time the number of agents whose money holdings
decrease by one (due to actually buying the good) is equal to the number of agents whose
money holdings increase by one (due to actually selling the good). This condition is satised
by stationarity of . This equilibrium is monetary by Lemma B.3. 
Theorem C.1 is a general existence result for monetary equilibria when the quantity of
money can be chosen by an institution outside the model of our monetary economy. This
raises the question on the optimum quantity of money. Obviously, any non-monetary equilib-
rium is Pareto-dominated by every monetary equilibrium. However, this does not provide a
satisfactory answer in the case of a benevolent social planner who maximizes the welfare in the
economy. The most simple measure is that of the number of trades. If there is rationing, some
agents cannot realize their plans and thus obtain lower utility than in an equilibrium without
rationing. While this criterion only measures individual but not social welfare it provides a
simple benchmark for the social planner's policy. We have the following result.
Corollary C.1 For any characteristics of the representative agent there exists some quantity
of money M
?
and a corresponding monetary stationary equilibrium such that p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1.
Every quantity of money which is dierent to M
?
leads to a monetary stationary equi-
librium in which the number of trades is strictly less than with M
?
.
Proof. The number of trades is obviously maximal, if p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1. According to Theo-
rem C.1 such an equilibrium exists.
The number of trades is maximal if no rationing occurs. We have to compare the utility an
agent obtains in the equilibrium without rationing (p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1) and the quantity of money
M
?
with the utility in any other equilibrium (with the quantity of money M
1
). In the second
equilibrium rationing has to occur, because if (p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1 the policies of the agents would
be the same, leading to the same Markov chain and the same optimal quantity of money. If
rationing occurs in an equilibrium the utility that a player obtains in this equilibrium is lower
than in a non equilibrium policy combination without rationing in which the same policy is
used, but the quantity of money M
2
is dierent. For the same policy a policy combination
always gives at least the same utility to players in a market if nor rationing occurs. This
non equilibrium policy combination is dominated by the equilibrium policy combination with
(p
?
B
= p
?
S
= 1 and the quantity of money M
?
, because the equilibrium policy is the solution
to the Bellman equations without rationing.
It is legitimate to call the quantity of money that is determined by Corollary C.1 the
optimum quantity of money.
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